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STRUCTURING TRANSACTIONS OUTSIDE ALL
HOLDERS/BEST PRICE RULE
Mark Khmelnitskiy*

INTRODUCTION

Two-tier, front-loaded, all-cash, first-come, first-serve tender offer
for 51% of stock, with a subsequent junk bonds squeeze-out of the
second-step merger was a popular tactic for making a tender offer in the
laissez-faire, caveat emptor era before the regulations of tender offers
were introduced.' This outrageously unfair, nevertheless lawful, method
of coercing shareholders to tender their shares was finally prohibited by
Congress in the Williams Act and by the subsequent rules of the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).2 However, the broad
application of the established rules infringes on many lawful and
frequently necessary transactions, exposing acquiring companies to
liability and unexpected expenses.3
Such transactions, usually consummated at the time or around the
time of the tender offer, include retaining the target company's
J.D., Fordham University School of Law, 2003; B.A., Pace
University, 2000.
Currently at Zetlin & De Chiara, LLP, New York. The author would like to express his
deepest gratitude to the editorial board and staff of the Fordham Journal of Corporate &
Financial Law for their continued support, confidence and assistance in preparation of
this Note in its final form. The author would also like to thank his brothers and
Professor Richard McDermott who inspired his interest in finance and corporate law
and Irina Shekhets for her invaluable critique of the earlier drafts of this Note.
1. See Richard A. Booth, The Problem with FederalTender Offer Law, 77 CAL. L.
REv. 707, 710-11 (1989) (describing business practices that led to the passage of the
Williams Act).
2. See Michael D. Ebert, "Duringthe Tender Offer" (Or Some Other Time Near
It): Insider Transactions Under the All Holders/Best Price Rule, 47 VILL. L. REv. 677,
680-85 (2002) (discussing the background of the Williams Act and SEC Rule 14d-10).
3. See Ben Walther, Employment Agreements and Tender Offers: Reforming the
Problematic Treatment of Severance Plans under Rule 14d-10, 102 COLUM. L. REv.
774, 778 (2002) (describing the possible negative effect of Rule 14d-10 on employment
agreements).
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management, securing non-competition promises from the target
company's departing employees, purchasing the target company's patent
and licensing rights and other similar agreements, necessary for
successful operation of the acquired business.4 Those transactions create
additional payments outside of the tender offer and may violate SEC
Rule 14d-10, known as the All Holders/Best Price Rule.' The Rule
provides that a tender offer must be open to all holders of the security
and that each holder must be paid the "highest consideration paid to any
other security holder during such tender offer."6 Under the broad
application of Rule 14d-10, a side transaction would be included in the
tender offer, which could increase the price offered to specific
shareholders who are parties to the side agreement.7 This would
constitute a violation of Rule 14d-10 and significantly increase the
amount of the tender offer, causing additional expenses to the acquirer.8
While the provisions of Rule 14d-10 addressed the original purpose
of protecting security holders from coercive tender offers, within the
past decade, Rule 14d-10 has been invoked as a sword to invalidate
agreements made in conjunction with tender offers, or make the
agreements a part of the tender offers. 9 These agreements, although
frequently conferring various benefits upon key employees and
management, who are usually large security holders, nevertheless do not

4. See, e.g., Michael A. Hiltzik, Boardroom Battle Raged Over Times-Tribune
Deal, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2000, at CI (discussing the appropriateness of executive
compensation to Times Mirror CEO Mark Willes in the context of a tender offer); Rita
Ciolli & Pradnya Joshi, Deal's Silver Lining/ Times Mirror CEO to Get Going-Away
Package, NEWSDAY, Mar. 22, 2000, at A57 (covering the same news story); Susan
Chandler, Sears Not Alone in Pursuit of Lands' End; French Firm PPR the Likely
Rival, CHI. TRIB., May 23, 2002, at 1 (conferring the news of target executives
compensation by the acquirer); Jonathan Berr, Litton Executives to Get $45.9 MIn
Payment after Northrop Buy, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Feb. 1, 2001, at 6:56 PM EST
(reporting that target executives will receive a large payment for stocks and options
after the target is taken over).
5. See generally Millionerrors Inv. Club v. GE, P.L.C., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
4778, at * 11 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 8, 2000) (citing Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 50 F.3d 644, 652-53
(9th Cir. 1995), rev'd on other grounds, 516 U.S. 367 (1996)).
6.
17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-10(a) (2002).
7. See Walther, supra note 3, at 787.
8- Id.
9. Seeid. at 777 n.11.
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constitute a greater consideration for the tendered securities." °

The

courts, however, have entertained allegations that such agreements
violate Rule 14d-10 and created controversy in interpreting payments

and promises made near, or in relation to, tender offers."
The courts, when examining tender offers with side agreements that
potentially violate Rule 14d-10 have come to varying conclusions, and
use various methods to differentiate between the lawful and unlawful

transactions. 12 This legal uncertainty makes the option of a tender offer
less attractive, eventually harms the security holders, acquirer and target
companies and ultimately frustrates the concepts of efficient free market
economy and rational allocation of resources. 3 Clearly, in order to

engage in tender offers in the future, companies will require precise
guidelines as to what conduct and4 transactions made during a tender

offer will not violate Rule 14d-10.'

The first section of this paper will examine the range of transactions

that acquirers enter with key employees, executives and other large
security holders of target companies, the varying factual and legal
circumstances surrounding these transactions and the treatment of such
transactions before and around the time Rule 14d-10 was promulgated.

The second part will focus on recent court decisions examining
transactions made in connection with tender offers, illuminate the tests
that courts established to interpret such agreements, distinguish the
different approaches that the courts employed and discuss the effects of
these decisions on the practice of tender offers. Finally, the last part of

10. See Kramer v. Time Warner, Inc., 937 F.2d 767 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that the
large payment to target's executives was not made pursuant to a tender offer).
11.
See, e.g., Katt v. Titan Acquisition Ltd., 133 F. Supp. 2d 632 (M.D. Tenn.
2000) (finding circumstances sufficient to withstand defendants' motion to dismiss);
Millionerrors Inv. Club v. GE, P.L.C., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4778, at *4 (W.D. Pa.
Feb. 8, 2000) (entertaining plaintiffs claim that the additional payment was motivated
by "the sole objective of providing [shareholders] windfall profits").
Compare Field v. Trump, 850 F.2d 938 (2d Cir. 1988) (instituting a functional
12.
test) with Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 50 F.3d 644, 655-56 (9th Cir. 1995) (applying an
"integral part" standard) and Lerro v. Quaker Oats Co., 84 F.3d 239, 242-43 (7th Cir.
1996) (following a bright-line method),
13.
See Walther, supra note 3, at 804-05 (discussing some economic issues
associated with tender offers).
14. See id. at 807 (proposing that a refinement of existing law will promote
efficiency).
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this paper will recommend some guidelines for companies to structure
future transactions to avoid potential violations of Rule 14d- 10.
I.

A.

BACKGROUND

Various Transactionsin Relation to a Tender Offer

There are various reasons for an acquirer to make a tender offer,
5
ranging from a takeover effort to a large investment interest.
Furthermore, in a takeover bid, the acquirer can be interested in
reorganizing the target company, dissolving it, selling or transferring
some or all of its assets or merely modifying the way the company
operates. 16 In pursuit of these various interests, the acquirer might also
have to enter into additional transactions and agreements with target's
key employees, management or business partners.' 7 These transactions
could also be prompted by unique target company-specific long-term
contracts, indentures for outstanding debt issued by the target, by-laws
clauses and any other restrictions which might require payment of
cancellation, break-up or satisfaction fees.18
The most common transaction is when the acquirer retains
incumbent directors, executive officers or key employees to run the
target company even after the acquisition.' 9 The acquirer often provides
incentives in the form of an increased salary, promise of a large sign-on
(continuation) bonus, additional securities or stock options, promotion to
higher management positions and other tangible and intangible
benefits.2 ° Those benefits can come as an immediate lump sum or be
15. See generally id.
16. See id. at 805 (explaining various reasons for acquirer to enter into different
transactions with target's shareholders).
17. See William J. Altier, A Method for Unearthing Likely Post-Deal Snags,
MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS, Jan./Feb. 1997, at 33 (examining the motives for entering
into various employment agreements with target's employees).
18. See Hiltzik, supra note 4 (describing restrictions imposed on the target's largest
shareholder by other obligations).
19.
See ARTHUR H. KROLL, COMPENSATING EXECUTIVES 214-16 (1998)
(explaining the use of golden parachutes as incentives to retain employees).
20.
See, e.g., Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 50 F.3d 644, 659 (9th Cir. 1993) (discussing
the legality of the incentive payment); Katt v. Titan Acquisition Ltd., 133 F. Supp. 2d
632, 636 (M.D. Tenn. 2000) (providing incentives for employment termination); In re
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spread over a long term of anticipated employment relationship.2 ' The
challenge to such transaction stems from the allegation that in reality it
is merely an inducement to tender shares in response to the general
tender offer.22
Another common transaction is a non-competition agreement with
departing employees or management. 23 These transactions become
particularly relevant in technology and scientific industries, although
potentially could apply even to a company making cereals.24 The scope
and format of these agreements is standard in the business environment,
and would involve a promise not to engage in any competing activity in
return for some consideration.25 Such agreements are reviewed when
the non-competition agreement accompanies a tender of a significant
holding of securities, and the agreement is merely a vehicle to offer
greater consideration for securities.2 6
Similarly, patent-rights transfers, licensing agreements and
contracts with existing business partners become potential violations of
Rule 14d-10 when the parties to the agreement are also large security
holders of target's securities.2 7 In this scenario, the acquirer would ask a
distribution company, which is a target stockholder, to extend the
contract with the target after consummation of the tender offer. 28 This
transaction would fall under review when there is an allegation that the
extended contract is merely additional consideration to induce the

Digital Island Sec. Litig., 223 F. Supp. 2d 546, 550 (D. Del. 2002) (discussing
executive stock option plans); Harris v. Intel Corp., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13796, at
*16 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (disputing whether executive compensation violates SEC rules).
21.
Compare Epstein, 50 F.3d at 659 (a large tax-free lump payment to a retiring
executive) with Katt, 133 F. Supp. 2d at 636 (a bouquet of various short and long term
employment incentives).
22. See Walther, supra note 3, at 802 (describing view of side employment
contracts as additional compensation for a tender offer).
23. See Gerber v. Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc., 303 F.3d 126 (2d Cir. 2002);
Harris,2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13796, at *11.
24. See Gerber,303 F.3d at 126; Harris,2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13796, at *11.
25. See Gerber, 303 F.3d at 136 (explaining that the court admitted evidence of the
non-compete agreement after reviewing evidence of other similar agreements).
26. See id. (reviewing the legality of tender payments).
27. See Lerro v. Quaker Oats Co., 84 F.3d 239, 240 (7th Cir. 1996) (examining a
transaction between the acquirer and target's major distributor, owned by target's
shareholder).
See id.
28.
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participation in the tender offer.2 9 All of these transactions, and
potentially many others, are triggered by conditions and events that take
place at the time or around the time of a tender offer, and both the
acquirer and the target must respond to these conditions or events by
entering into various agreements, promises and payments.3 °
The scenarios for such transactions are very diverse and fact
intensive. 3'
Analysis requires an in-depth review of the facts
surrounding each transaction, as well as extensive information about the
target and acquirer companies, to understand the true motives behind
each transaction. 2 Only a close examination of the past and emerging
rights and obligations, pre-offer compensation packages and operations
of the companies will enable one to properly classify the transaction and
distinguish it from other agreements, made in conjunction with pending
33
tender offers and potentially violating Rule 14d-10.
B. Treatment of TransactionsOutside of Tender Offers Before Rule
14d-10
Before Congress passed the Williams Act, tender offers were a
popular method of corporate takeovers, because of little regulation and
the coercive advantage that acquirers could exercise over target
shareholders to obtain shares at a considerable discount.34 It was a
common practice to make a tender offer for less than 100% of the
outstanding stock and threaten with a subsequent squeeze-out at a lower
price to cause shareholders to panic and tender their shares in response
to the offer.35 Further, with an opportunity to incrementally increase the
consideration offered for tendered shares, the acquirer could start with a
low price and continue to gradually increase it until the entire offer

29. Id.
30. Id.
31.
See generally Field v. Trump, 850 F.2d 938 (2d Cir. 1988).
32. See id. at 944 (articulating a test which "scrutinizes such [transactions] in the
context of various salient characteristics of tender offers").
33. See id.
34. See Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 22 (1977) (discussing tender
offers practice and explaining the necessity of Williams Act amendments).
35. See id. at 35 (emphasizing that the purpose of the Williams Act was to provide
investors with adequate information necessary to respond to a tender offer).
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would fill up.3 6 Considering that shareholders did not know the rate at
which the offer was filling up at any price mark, and they had an
imminent danger of losing any premium if the offer was closed, the
average shareholders often tendered their shares at deflated prices.3 7 In
the legal environment where tender offers were largely unregulated,

acquirers could enter into any side transactions that would bring about a
less expensive tender offer.38

II. RULE 14D-10 AND RECENT COURT DECISIONS

A

Rule 14d-10

On this background of legal leniency and lack of supervision of side
transactions, the Delaware Supreme Court was finally faced with a

borderline transaction involving an offer that was not open to all
shareholders. 39 Following the established path, the court examined the
transaction against the background of governing state law, and failed to

consider the implications of Section 14(d)(7), of the Securities Exchange
Act, as amended. 4° The transaction involved a company's selective offer
to purchase its own outstanding shares at a premium price.4" The offer
36.
See Jacobs v. G. Heilman Brewing Co., Inc., 551 F. Supp. 639 (Del. Dist. Ct.
1982) (stating that parties making competing tender offers may incrementally increase
consideration while the tender offer remains open).
37. See Hanson Trust v. SCM Corp., 774 F.2d 47, 55 (2d Cir. 1983) (explaining
that without proper information, investors could not make rational decisions).
38. See Walther, supra note 3, at 780-81 (explaining that bidders could enter into
special agreements with certain shareholders to purchase shares at a premium without
increasing the tender offer price to all shareholders).
39. See Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum Corp., 493 A.2d 946, 953 (Del. 1985)
(examining appropriateness of an exchange offer discriminating against one shareholder
under the "business judgment rule," and not applying the Williams Act).
40.
15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(7) (2002) provides:
Where any person varies the terms of a tender offer or request or invitation for tenders
before the expiration thereof by increasing the consideration offered to holders of such
securities, such person shall pay the increased consideration to each security holder
whose securities are taken up and paid for pursuant to the tender offer or request or
invitation for tenders whether or not such securities have been taken up by such
person before the variation of the tender offer or request or invitation.
41.
See Unocal, 493 A.2d at 953 (stating that Delaware law allows a corporation to
deal in its own stock).
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was a defensive measure in response to a threat of a hostile takeover by
one of the largest shareholders.42 The offer was structured in such a way
that it excluded the hostile shareholder, while inviting all the other
shareholders to tender their shares for a significant premium. 43 The
court examined the validity of the transaction under state corporation
law and upheld the transaction as a proper and adequate exercise of the
Business Judgment Rule. 44
The SEC immediately responded to that decision by issuing Rule
14d-10 41, which substantially redefined Section 14(d)(7), and
specifically provided that: "(i) a tender offer must be extended to all
holders of the class of securities which is the subject of the offer (the "all
holders requirement"); and (ii) all such holders must be paid the highest
consideration offered under the tender offer (the "best-price rule"). 4 6
In the ensuing release4 7 , the SEC provided a detailed explanation
for the reasons and purposes of Rule 14d-10, as well as provided a
preview of what the future application of the Rule would be. 48 The
SEC's position was that the All Holders/Best Price "requirements
further the purposes of the Williams Act by assuring fair and equal
treatment of all holders. . .,.
In fact, the SEC explicitly stated that
Rule 14d-10 is necessary to avoid the practice of discriminatory tender
offers, and that Congress did not intend to "permit such selective
protections of target company security holders. ' 0
The SEC's basis for the All Holders portion of the rule is inferred
from Congress' "understanding that all security holders were to have the
42.

See id. at 954.

43. See id. at 958 (holding that a corporation does not have to include the
shareholder who is causing the threat in a beneficial repurchase offer).
44. Id. The court examined the offer against the state corporate laws and
concluded that the transaction was an appropriate response to a correctly identified
threat.
45. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-10 (2002) (providing Rule 14d-10); see also
Amendments to Tender Offer Rules; All-Holders and Best-Price, 51 Fed. Reg. 25,873
(Jul. 17, 1986) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt.200,240) [hereinafter Amendments to Tender
Offer Rules].
46. See Ebert, supra note 2, at 683 (quoting 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-10 which
provides Rule 14d-10).
47. See Amendments to Tender Offer Rules; supra note 45.
48.
49.
50.

Id.
Id. at 25,875.
Id.
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opportunity to participate in a tender offer."'"
Further, the SEC
concluded that while a tender offer could be for less than all the
securities of a specified class, the offer must be available to all security
holders. 2 Coupled with Section 14(d)(7), which provided for the
highest consideration to all tendering security holders, the SEC
formulated the All Holders/Best Price Rule in its current format.5 3 It
should be noted, though, that the SEC recognized the "statutory purpose
of investor protection... in a neutral manner" and while drafting the
Rule "avoided favoring either management or the takeover bidder. 5' 4 In
light of this, the SEC explained that while the consideration offered for
the securities may vary in type and does not have to be "equivalent in
value," the security holders should be able to choose the consideration
5
they prefer.
Rule 14d-10 was issued in response to a transaction that fell outside
of the scope of Section 14(d)(7) and enabled the party making the tender
offer to discriminate against a specific shareholder while favoring the
5 6 It was evident that
others.
the SEC took a position that all transactions
in connection with a tender offer must treat all target company security
holders equally.5 7 Therefore, Rule 14d-10, effectively alleviated the
threat of disparate and inequitable treatment of specific target security
holders, which actually prompted the establishment of the Rule."
Rule 14d-10 was drafted very broadly specifically to reach the
garden variety of discriminatory transactions and undermine the practice
of such transactions.5 9 However, many legitimate and appropriate
transactions in connection with tender offers also invoked application of
Rule 14d-10 and exposed the parties to liability under Federal Securities
51. Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. section 78n(d)(1) and 15 U.S.C. section 78n(d)(6) which
provide Sections 14(d)(1) and 14(d)(6) of the Williams Act).
52. Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. section 78n(d)(6) which provides Section 14(d)(6) of
Williams Act).
53.
It should be noted that Rule 14d-10 has never been amended. See 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14d-10 (2002).
54. See Amendments to Tender Offer Rules, supra note 45.
55. See id.; cf 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-10 n.47.
56. See Amendments to Tender Offer Rules, supra note 45; cf. 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14d-10 n.75.
57. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-10 (providing Rule 14d-10).
58. See Amendments to Tender Offer Rules, supra note 45; cf. 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14d-10 n.3.
59. See Amendments to Tender Offer Rules, supra note 45.
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laws.6 ° Under Rule's broad application, any side agreement that
involved a shareholder and the party making a tender offer would
constitute a payment of additional consideration. Employee-retaining
contracts and non-competition agreements started to fall in the risk zone
of violating Rule 14d-10 and increasing the overall price of the tender
offer. 6 The companies found themselves in the dire straits where a
sound business decision would invalidate an equally sound tender offer
and vice versa.
Promulgating Rule 14d-10, the SEC failed to recognize its
overbearing drastic effect on legitimate transactions. 6 However, as was
said above, those transactions were not the focus of the SEC when the
Rule was drafted, and the transactions did not come into focus until
years later.63 Only starting in the early nineties, due to the rapid growth
of economy and fast technological advances, the companies did begin to
enter into non-competition and future-employment agreements with
target's key employees and managers.' Further, due to an increasingly
popular practice to reward employees with company stock and stock
options, key employees and managers also accumulated large holdings
of company's shares. 65 Therefore, regardless of its legitimacy, any side
transaction between an acquirer and target's employees or managers
66
potentially violates the All Holder/Best Price requirements of Rule 14d-10.
B. JudicialInterpretationof Side Transactionsin Relation to Tender
Offers
Absent any specific language discussing the broad application of
Rule 14d-10 or Section 14(d)(7), courts were called upon to interpret

60. See generally Ebert, supra note 2; Walther, supra note 3.
61.
See Walther, supra note 3, at 778.
62. See Ebert, supra note 2, at 677-78.
63. See Walther, supra note 3, at 778 n.12 ("In fairness, the problem has only
recently come to light... and only a handful of circuits (the Second, Seventh, and
Ninth Circuits) have ruled on the precise issue.").
64. Id. at 775-78 (discussing post merger employment issues that have arisen since
the adoption of 14d-10).
65. See Berr, supranote 4 (describing such payments as common).
66. See Ebert, supra note 2, at 687 (asserting that "the securities laws should be
interpreted liberally to reflect their remedial purposes").
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legitimacy of side transactions.67

Unable to come to a uniform

conclusion, circuits developed two methods to apply Rule 14d-10 to side

transactions. 6' The first method focuses on the functionality and role of
the transaction in the underlying tender offer.69

The other method

promotes a formal approach of establishing specific guidelines for the
timing of tender offers and examining side transactions with respect to
this timeline.7 °
While professionals are concerned about the legal uncertainty of
interpreting legitimate side transactions in the context of tender offers,
academics are not satisfied with any of the proposed methods. 7 ' The

"functional" approach invites courts to closely examine each transaction
and scrutinize every fact.72 Clearly, this will enable many claims to
survive the Summary Judgment stage and proceed to trials, potentially

exposing acquiring companies to erroneous jury verdicts or large
settlements. 73 At the same time, the "formal" approach will provide explicit
guidelines and enable companies to avoid the application of Rule 14d-10,

67. See Walther, supra note 3, at 791 (discussing judicial application of the
"integral part analysis and the legitimacy of various side transactions").
68. There are actually three distinct methods, but two of them can be united under
the term 'functional.'
For more information about the difference between the
'functional' and 'integral part' tests, see Ebert, supra note 2, at 687-95.
69. See Field v. Trump, 850 F.2d 938, 943-44 (2d Cir. 1988); Epstein v. MCA,
Inc., 50 F.3d 644, 657 (9th Cir. 1993).
70. See Lerro v. Quaker Oats Co., 84 F.3d 239, 244 (discussing the need for bright
line guidelines when large amounts of money are at stake).
71.
Compare Ebert, supra note 2, at 688-95 (debating the merits of different
methods for analyzing tender offers) with Walther, supra note 3, at 784 (discussing how
the functionalist approach is over inclusive).
72. See Field, 850 F.2d at 944 (noting that transactions near the time of a tender
offer may be of great importance to shareholders); Epstein, 50 F.3d at 654 (discussing
how determining if a transaction violates Rule 14(d)-10 depends on the consideration
given, and whether the transactions constituting consideration occur within the tender
offer period).
73. See Shearman & Sterling, Recent Developments Related to Employment
Arrangements on the Context of Public Tender Offers and Exchange Offers 1 (Mar.

2001), available at http://www.shearman.com/documents/MA0301.pdf (last visited
Dec. 30, 2003). See also Stephen J. Jacobs, Special Deals Tied to Tender Offers (Apr.
2001), available at

http://www.weil.com/wgm/CWGMPubs.nsf/46b9f566b830f4cd85256658007515d3/264
2fe517472134285256a310061d433?OpenDocument (last visited Dec. 30, 2003).
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even structuring illegal transactions.74 As was correctly summarized by one
of the observers, "the underinclusiveness of the formalist approach mirrors
'7 5
the overinclusiveness of the functionalist approach."
1. The "Functional"Method
Initially, the functional method was established to determine the
legality of a private stock purchase made in the time period between a
withdrawn and a subsequently resubmitted tender offers. 76 The trial
court dismissed the complaint reasoning that Rule 14d- 10 did not govern
transactions not made pursuant to a tender offer.77 The Second Circuit
determined that the Rule would be handicapped if acquirers could
withdraw tender offers, negotiate private agreements with selected
security holders, and announce subsequent, less valuable, tender offers.78
To determine the applicability of Rule 14d-10, the court closely
examined the transaction and concluded that, in fact, the second tender
offer constituted the continuation of the withdrawn offer, and therefore,
79
the private agreement violated Rule 14d-10.
While the conclusion of the court was certainly warranted under the
facts of the case, the court established a broad functional method, which
invited courts to scrutinize every transaction on a case-by-case basis.8 0
74. See Walther, supra note 3, at 797-801 (criticizing the test articulated in Lerro
and Walkerv. Shield Acquisition Corp., 145 F. Supp. 2d 1360 (N.D. Ga. 2001).
75. Id. at 779.
76. See Field, 850 F.2d at 942 (noting that the functional method scrutinizes
various characteristics of tender offers, while also considering the purposes of the
Williams Act).
77. See id. (explaining that the court dismissed for failure to state a claim under
14(d)(7)).
78. Id. at 944.
79. See id.
80. See, e.g., Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 50 F.3d 644, 655 (9th Cir. 1995) (discussing
the importance of examining transactions near the tender offer to determine if there is a
statutory violation); Gerber v. Computer Assocs. Int'l., Inc., 303 F.3d 126, 132 (2d Cir.
2002) (the court concluded that a press release constituted a tender offer, and conditions
arising after the press release did not prevent the press release from marking the
commencement of the tender offer period); Kramer v. Time Warner, Inc., 937 F.2d 767,
773 (noting that the court took notice of documents surrounding the complaint even
though they were not exhibits to the complaint); Kahn v. Va. Ret. Sys., 13 F.3d 110 (4th
Cir. 1993) (where the court examined a press release as a transaction surrounding a
tender offer).
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While the court failed to establish any specific guidelines or
characteristics that would distinguish legitimate transactions from those
violating Rule 14d-10, the only standard that the court articulated
involved an analysis of the acquirer's intentions in the "surrounding
circumstances" and the function that the transaction achieves. 8'
The subsequent application of the functional approach, absent a
defined structure of factors to examine transactions under Rule 14d-10,
led courts to even greater uncertainty.82 Unable to rely on or formulate a
more a definite standard, courts struggled to distinguish between
legitimate and improper transactions.8 3 In one instance, the Second
Circuit determined that a transaction, in which the executives' stock
options were cashed out at a higher price immediately before the second
step of the two-step merger was not a part of a tender offer and did not
invoke application of the Best Price Rule.8 4 The court came to this
conclusion after closely examining the transaction and finding that the
payment of a higher premium for the options took place five months
after the tender offer and was made by the target company and not by
the acquirer.85 However, the court could have come to a diametrically
opposite conclusion, if instead it focused on the fact that the premium
payments were specified in the original merger agreement, which
initiated the tender offer.8 6 Thus, the fluid functional approach, which
required the courts to examine the intent and circumstances of each
transaction in question, nonetheless failed to provide any definite factors
or characteristics to determine the legitimacy of a side transaction.87
The Second Circuit continued to struggle with the functional
method interpreting a non-competition agreement between the acquirer

81.

See Field,850 F.2d at 943.

82.
83.

See Epstein, 50 F.3d at 654-56.
Id. at 658.

84. See Kramer, 937 F.2d at 776 (where the court determined an action did not
invoke application of the best price rule based on an examination of related documents
bearing on the adequacy of disclosure and documents alleged to contain misleading
statements).
85.

Id.

86. Id. at 779.
87. See Epstein, 50 F.3d at 656 (holding that the court understood the necessity of
examining factors beyond whether or not the transaction was a private placement, and
the court still failed to determine illegality).
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and the target's CEO.88 The court, again, closely examined the
transaction and upheld the jury's verdict in favor of the plaintiff
shareholder, finding that the non-competition agreement in part
constituted additional consideration paid to the target CEO in connection
with a tender offer.8 9 The panel aggregated the additional payment with
the tender offer largely on technical grounds of the timing of the offer and
non-competition agreement. 9° Nonetheless, while the court cited witness
testimony when finding that the compensation under the non-competition
agreement was derived "by "intuition" without any "mathematic
analysis," 9' there is a possibility that a properly structured and accounted
92
non-competition agreement would withstand the court's scrutiny.
A more specific form of a functional approach was established by
the Ninth Circuit, which determined that a transaction must play an
integral part in the tender offer to invoke the all-holders, best-price
Rule. 93 While professing to use a more precise functional test, the court
examined the role that the transaction was given by the acquirer and
whether that role was integral to the making of, or contingent on the
success of the offer. 94 Yet, in search of definite factors, the court singled
out the very factors that usually become the terms in any side agreement,
where the acquirer wants to secure shareholder's future employment. 95
Similarly, in a subsequent case involving a promise to grant additional

88. See Gerber v. Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc., 303 F.3d 126, 131 (2d Cir. 2002)
(describing that the court had to decide whether the payment to the CEO was for
company shares, for an agreement not to compete, or a combination of both).
89. Id. at 137.
90. Id. at 133.
91.
Id. at 138.
92. See id. at 137-38. Because the court based its decision on the imprecise
manner in which the amount of compensation had been determined, the case leaves
open the possibility that compensation clearly tied to a valid goal will not violate the
all-holders, best-price Rule.
93. See Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 50 F.3d 644, 656 (9th Cir. 1995), rev'd on other
grounds, 516 U.S. 367 (1996) (determining that the transaction was indeed integral in
that the subsequent loans were conditioned on terms of the public tender offer).
94. See id. at 656 (showing that the loan agreement and the tender offer differed
only in the type of consideration, making the transaction in violation of Rule 14dl0(c)(1)).
95. See id.; see also Shearman & Sterling, supra note 73 (discussing the difficulty
of distinguishing the arrangements made for legitimate business reasons from illegal
additional compensation).
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stock options to target's employees, the court refused to dismiss the
claim that the promise constituted a larger consideration for tendering
target's stock.96 In the more recent cases, two district courts followed
the same method, and concluded that transactions involving payments or
promises made to target's key employees were made in connection with
tender offers and violated Rule 14d-10.97 In the first case, the court
decided that the agreements were integral to the tender offer because
they explicitly relied on the success of the offer, despite the fact that the
agreements were made a few months before the tender offer was
announced. 98 In the second, the stock options to target executives were
granted by the target more than a month in advance of the acquisition,
but were nonetheless considered an integral part of the tender offer and
violated the all-holders, best-price Rule. 99
Overall, the functional approach was established to provide a
substantive basis to application of Rule 14d-10 to side transactions in
connection with tender offers.' 00 However, while inviting courts to
examine transactions on a case-by-case basis, both the Second and the
Ninth Circuits failed to articulate any definite factors that would 0distinguish
legitimate transactions from mere efforts to escape Rule 14d-10.1 1

96. See Perera v. Chiron Corp., 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22503 (N.D. Cal. May 8,
1996) (holding that Rule 14d-10 prohibits unequal treatment of shareholders in
connection with a tender offer).
97. See Katt v. Titan Acquisition Ltd., 133 F. Supp. 2d 632, 644 (M.D. Tenn. 2000)
(showing that the court prohibits making a deal more appealing to certain investors at
the possible expense of others); Millionerrors Inv. Club v. GE, P.L.C., 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 4778, at *5 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 8, 2000) (examining the fact that shareholder value
was diminished in the form of cashed-out options going to the directors that was
rightfully theirs).
98. See Katt, 133 F. Supp. 2d at 644-45 (holding that the rule would not have been
violated provided that the terms were not contingent on one another).
99. See MillionerrorsInv. Club, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4778, at *5 (describing the
inequity associated with the fact that the options received by executives caused them to
receive a better price than the shareholders, which is violation of the rule).
100. Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 50 F.3d 644, 652-53 (9th Cir. 1995), rev'd on other
grounds, 516 U.S. 367 (1996) (describing that Rule 14d-10 was created to forbid
discrimination among shareholders).
101.
See Shearman & Sterling, supra note 73, at 3 (criticizing the Katt court for
failure to articulate any definite guidance and implication that any employment
agreement will violate Rule 14d-10).
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2. The "Formal"(Bright-Line)Method.
The formal method of interpreting Rule 14d-10 is dramatically
different from the functional method, in that it does not examine the
facts surrounding the transaction in question and the tender offer, but
merely looks at the plain language of Rule 14d-10.'0 2 Consequently,
transactions that do not fall under direct application of Rule 14d-10,
namely transactions not made "during or pursuant" to a tender offer, are
deemed appropriate.' °3
This standard was devised to validate a private stock purchase
10 4
transaction, which was commenced before the tender offer was made.
This standard has been followed to validate private stock purchase
transactions that were commenced before the tender offer was made.
The Fourth Circuit reasoned that integrating the transaction with the
tender offer would substantially destroy any definite notion of when the
tender offer commences.'0 5 Concluding that the purposes of Rule 14d2(c) would be frustrated if notions of "during or pursuant" to a tender
offer were interpreted loosely, the court found the transaction to be
outside of the scope of the rule. 0 6 While the court's reasoning clearly
warranted the decision in this case, the court followed a test that
transactions, so long as they fell
practically endorsed discriminatory
07
1
offers.
tender
formal
of
outside
This approach was later followed by the Seventh Circuit, which
ruled that a transaction between an acquirer and target's largest
distributor, which incidentally was controlled by a large target
shareholder, also did not fall within Rule 14d-10, because it did not
constitute additional consideration for tendered shares.108 In deciding
this case, the court applied a very narrow formal interpretation of Rule

102. See Lerro v. Quaker Oats Co., 84 F.3d 239, 246 (7th Cir. 1996).
103. Id.
104. See Kahn v. Va. Ret. Sys., 13 F.3d 110, 115 (4th Cir. 1993) (dismissing a case
because transactions in question occurred before the date of commencement of the
tender offer).
105. See id. at 116 (stating that holding a press release of a proposed transaction not
strictly conforming to 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-2(c) would remove certainty of when a
tender offer commences).
106. Id. at 114-15.
107. See Kramer v. Time Warner, Inc., 937 F.2d 767 (2d Cir. 1991).
108. See Lerro v. Quaker Oats Co., 84 F.3d 239, 243 (7th Cir. 1996).
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14d-10, and found that there was no additional payment made to the
target's shareholder pursuant to the tender offer.' °9 This case involved
an unusual transaction, where the acquirer extended target's contract
with one of the target's largest distributors." 0 The claim was founded
on the fact that the distributor was controlled by target's shareholder,
who implicitly received increased consideration for tendering target's
shares."' The court concluded that the transaction was made prior to the
tender offer, but the method that the court applied enables acquirers to
structure discriminatory transactions in a way that evades the application
which was specifically designed to reach such
of Rule 14d-10,
1 12
transactions.'
Failing to recognize the drawbacks of the formal approach, another
court dismissed a complaint alleging additional consideration paid in
connection with a tender offer." 3 Refusing to examine the transaction
itself, the court reviewed the timing of the transaction, the timing of the
payment and the time when the tender offer was announced, and concluded
that Rule 14d-10 did not apply to the transaction, because the offer was
made 20 days after the agreement to grant "Retention and Transition
Awards" to certain targets' employees, who also tendered stock.' 14
The formal method followed in a case where the court correctly
concluded not to "thin" out the application of Rule 14d to any
transactions broadly around a tender offer." 5 However, the subsequent
blind application of that method focused on the irrelevant factors of the
timing of the offer and left the subject of review, the actual transactions,
outside of the examination.1 1 6 While the functional method fails to
109.
110.

Id.
Id. at 240.

111.

Id. at 241-42.

112. See Kahn v. Va. Ret. Sys., 13 F.3d 110, 113 (4th Cir. 1993) (discussing the
Williams Act, which added § 14(d) to the Exchange Act; the court stated that the
purpose of the Act was to curb the use of cash tender offers to effectuate corporate

takeovers).
113. See Walker v. Shield Acquisition Corp., 145 F. Supp. 2d 1360, 1374 (N.D. Ga.
2001).
114. Id.; cf Susquehanna Capital Group v. Rite Aid Corp., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
18290 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 18, 2002) (declining to examine the substance of the transaction,
the court dismissed the complaint alleging tender offer violation on technical grounds of
the timing of the offer).
115. See Kramer v. Time Warner, Inc., 937 F.2d 767, 776 (2d Cir. 1991).
116. See id.
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communicate any factors that would exclude proper and legitimate
transactions from application of Rule 14d-10, the formal method
provides too much leeway for abusive and discriminatory agreements to
escape the review under the rule. "Neither approach carries much hope
of tailoring the liability narrowly to the behavior the rule intends to
discourage."" 7
C. Effects of "Functional"and "Formal"Methods
While the Circuits are entertaining themselves with various
methods to interpret Rule 14d-10 and apply the rule to side transactions,
the real participants of these transactions are suffering from the legal
uncertainty.
The varying treatment of outside transactions leads
acquirers to select favorable jurisdictions to proceed with the desired
transactions, while avoiding the jurisdictions applying the functional
method. In fact, despite the commitment of some Circuits to the formal
method, there always remains the risk that the court will revisit the issue
and decide to adhere to the functional method, articulated by other Circuits.
The effect of the split, therefore, revolves around the functional
method and the underlying risks it carries to acquirers entering into side
transactions. As the latest decision in the Second Circuit indicated, there
are no definite factors that the court will consider in examining the
independent validity of a side transaction. 1 8 Therefore, the court
offered no guidance for acquirers on how to structure transactions or
which factors to stress to be able to dismiss a complaint before
proceeding to discovery." 9 One can certainly understand the reasoning
of the court, refusing to provide any specific guidelines, and therefore,
enabling a crafty acquirer to bypass them. 120 At the same time, the court
is willing to enable meritless claims to proceed through discovery and

117.
Walther, supra note 3, at 801 (stating that the formalistic courts are too
stringent and dismiss viable claims, while the functionalist courts are too permissive
and allow speculative claims to reach discovery).
118.
See Gerber v. Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc., 303 F.3d 126, 136 (2d Cir. 2002)
(deciding the case based on strict application of "during" in 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-2(c)).
119.
See id. at 134 (unwilling to formulate definite limitations of Rule 14d-10 to
avoid potential circumvention).
120.
See id. (holding that the court would not create definitive limits of Rule 14d-

10).
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potentially go to trial.' 21 While a reasonably objective jury may find that
the majority of claims are meritless, the threat of losing at trial and the
fear of enormous liability pressure acquirers
to settle the claims for high
22
claims.
the
of
merits
the
to
prices, relative
In addition to the threat of being found in violation of Rule 14d-10,
acquirers must also fear the monetary liability that springs from the
violation. Under the rule, if a side transaction is found to constitute
additional consideration in connection with a tender offer, such
23
consideration must be paid to each tendering security holder.1
Consider a legitimate non-competition agreement with the target's
founder, CEO and holder of patent rights for $2 million for 5 years.
Assume that the tender offer is for $50 per share, and the target's CEO
tenders 5000 shares, which constitute 5% of the outstanding stock. If the
non-competition agreement is deemed a part of the tender offer, the CEO
receives a premium of $400 for each share over the price of the tender
offer. Under Rule 14d-10, the acquirer would have to raise the entire
tender offer by this amount, incurring additional expense of $40 million.
Mere exposure to large liability should not protect acquirers from
the application of Rule 14d-10.12 4 However, the Circuits applying
functional method should fashion some guidelines how to approach and
review transactions.
It could be argued, however, that the courts
implicitly communicated some guidelines. 26 For instance, in a variety
of cases, the courts applying functional method considered it significant
that the outside transaction was conditioned upon success of the tender
offer. 27 Also, some courts paid attention to circumstances when the side
121.
See Walther, supra note 3, at 795.
122. See id. at 779 (indicating that high damages will force a defendant to settle).
123.
See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-10 (2002) (providing Rule 14d-10).
124. See Walther, supra note 3, at 779 (arguing that high damages or the underinclusiveness of a mechanical test should be disposed of in evaluating a 14d- 10 claim).
125. See id. at 785 (indicating that the use of surrounding circumstances and bidder
intent is "difficult to apply in a consistent fashion").
126. See id. at 784 (noting that the formalist and functionalist paradigms allowed
judges to come to equitable solutions in disparate factual situations).
127. See, e.g., Perera v. Chiron Corp., 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22503, *9 (N.D. Cal.
May 8, 1996) (holding that the proper inquiry about a violation of Rule 14d-10 is
whether or not "the challenged transaction was an 'integral' part of the tender offer");
Millionerrors Inv. Club v. GE, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4778, *5 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 8, 2000)
(noting that executives were paid $26,065,050 in order to secure the tender offer); Katt
v. Titan Acquisition, Ltd., 133 F. Supp. 2d 632, 643-44 (M.D. Tenn. 2000) (holding
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agreements were mentioned in the tender offers or merger agreements,
or were actually made part of those agreements. 28 At the same time,
merely including the outside transaction in the merger agreement 29
was
not sufficient to put the transaction within the scope of Rule 14d-10.'
Interestingly, the very factors that the courts considered indicative
of the connection between the transactions in question and tender offers,
1 30
are the factors usually associated with an employment agreement.
Conditioning the agreement on success of the tender offer, disclosing the
agreement together with other information about tender offer, and even
pegging the future compensation to the price of the offer are all factors
in a valid employment agreement.'
Indeed, the agreement should go
into effect only if: 1) the tender offer is successful, 2) the information
about this transaction could be considered material and should be
disclosed, and 3) employee compensation relates to the well-being of the
32
company, or its stock price.
Courts applying functional method frequently paid little attention to
the actual intent of the transacting parties, leaving this conclusion to the
jury or inviting the parties to settle the claim.133 Courts refused to
recognize that certain agreements clearly provided no other benefit to the
acquirer other than retaining the key target's employees and managers,

that a "private purchase of stock and a public tender offer" do not make one tender offer
according to Rule 14d- 10, if all terms of the tender offer are independent).
128. See Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 50 F.3d 644, 656 (9th Cir. 1995), rev'd on other
grounds, 516 U.S 367 (1996) (indicating that the agreement was "conditioned on the
terms of the public tender offer .. "); Perera, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22503, at *9
("[T]he Tender Offer provision and option enhancements were contained in the same
Investment Agreement....").
129. See Kramer v. Time Warner, Inc., 937 F.2d 767, 775 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding
that the trading value of the Securities Package did not make the Offer to Purchase a
misrepresentation).
130. See, e.g., Perera, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22503 at *11 (discussing incentive
bonuses to executives); Millionerrors Inv. Club, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4778, at *5
(discussing the more than $26 million paid to GE executives); Katt, 133 F. Supp. 2d at
644-45 (stating that Titan officers were paid $30 million).
131. See Walther, supra note 3, at 794.
132. See id. (naming factors necessary to the implementation of a merger
agreement).
133. See id. at 786-87 (discussing the Gerber and Kramer courts' refusals to
evaluate a formal business purpose for a payment and rather only look to the origin of
the payment to determine propriety).
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because the tender offers were obviously oversubscribed or 3because
there
4
shares.
their
tender
to
employees
the
for
was no requirement
At the same time, intent was also never examined when courts
applied formal method.' 35 While the formal approach promises that a
transaction will not be deemed a part of tender offer if it was
consummated outside of the time of the offer, as defined by SEC Rule
14d-2, courts might soon catch on to the obvious flaw of this method
and abandon it. Indeed, under strict interpretation of the terms "during
or pursuant" to a tender offer, a "boot" transaction would not violate
Rule 14d-10.13 6 A "boot" transaction provides that specific tendering
security holders will receive additional consideration after the
completion of the tender offer, and is precisely
the kind of transaction
37
that Rule 14d- 10 was designed to prevent.
While the Circuits are split over which method is more appropriate
to interpret Rule 14d-10, and to promote the goals articulated by
Congress and the SEC, neither the functional nor the formal methods
offer a satisfactory solution.'3 8 Whereas the formal method clearly does
not reach the very transactions that the SEC tried to prohibit, the
functional method has no viable mechanism to limit meritless claims or
dismiss them at the pleadings stage. 39 However, there has been
speculation that the SEC will begin to look into what are legitimate
employment or severance agreements.

134. See, e.g., Perera, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22503, at *11 (indicating that
incentive bonuses "were not consideration because they were not offered in a quid pro
quo exchange for the tender of Chiron employee option holder's stock"); Millionerrors
Inv. Club, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4778, at *5 (discussing the more than $26 million
paid to GE executives); Katt, 133 F. Supp. 2d at 644-45 (stating that Titan officers were
paid $30 million to induce support for a tender offer, but no part of the agreement
included a requirement that the holders tendered their shares). See also Walther, supra
note 3, at 790 (noting that the Katt court did not invalidate an agreement because of
payment to Titan executives).
135. See Lerro v. Quaker Oats Co., 84 F.3d 239, 244 (7th Cir. 1996) (examining
transaction, not intent); Walker v. Shield Acquisition Corp. 145 F. Supp. 2d, 1360, 1367
(N.D. Ga. 2001) (indicating that courts look at transactions, not at the parties' intent).
.136. See Walther, supra note 3, at 799 (noting that "boot" transactions, in which
some of the promised cash is delivered at a later date, would be payment pursuant to a
tender offer).
137.

See id.

138.
139.

See id. at 778-79.
Id. at 778.
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III. AVOIDING LIABILITY UNDER RULE 14D-10

When making a tender offer, the acquirer may pursue different
business plans for future operations of the target company. The acquirer
may wish to offer future employment to current management and key
employees of the target, retain contacts with major business partners or
clients of the target or structure a non-competition agreement with the
target's departing personnel and management. All of these transactions,
often vital to the business plan of the acquisition, may be unavailable to
140
the acquirer.
Some courts' functional interpretation of Rule 14d-10 led to
integration of outside transactions into tender offers, thus invalidating
the outside transactions and exposing acquirers to liability for violation
of Rule 14d-10.14 ' While unwilling to articulate a definite standard,
courts assumed a functional method of examining each transaction on a
case-by-case basis, and have come to distinguish various factors in
142
arriving at conclusions.
Acquiring companies, interested in structuring a side transaction
with the target's employees, managers or business partners face difficult
choices. 43 While such transactions certainly serve sound business
purposes, they expose acquiring companies to enormous liability of
violating Rule 14d-10.144 So far, the courts have been unable to

140. See Shearman & Sterling, supra note 73, at 2.
141.
See Walther, supra note 3, at 784-85.
142. See, e.g., Katt v. Titan Acquisition, Ltd., 133 F. Supp. 2d 632, 644 (M.D. Tenn.
2000) (adopting the functional test of the Second and the Ninth circuits to examine the
facts of the case); Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 50 F.3d 644, 656 (9th Cir. 1995) (observing
that "because the Williams Act and its implementing regulations do not define the term
tender offer, courts faced with the question of whether purchases of a corporation shares
are privately negotiated have applied a function test that scrutinizes such purchases in
the context of various salient characteristics of tender offers and the purposes of the
Williams Act"); Millionerrors Inv. Club v. GE, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4778, *5 (W.D.
Pa. Feb. 8, 2000) (suggesting ways in which courts use the functional method in
examining transactions); Gerber v. Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc., 303 F.3d 126, 136 (2d
Cir. 2002) (comparing and distinguishing transactions by assessing various factors
present in each case).
See Perera, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22503, at *6-*7; Katt, 133 F. Supp. 2d at
143.
634.
144. See Walther, supra note 3, at 806-10.
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communicate a definite standard, leaving acquiring companies in the
45
dark.
However, although there are no set guidelines for structuring side
transactions, the courts have focused on various factors and assigned
different roles to those factors. 46 The acquirers, therefore, can attempt
to avoid triggering those factors. 47 A careful examination of all the
factors reviewed by courts applying functional method can yield a more
definite answer as to what conduct and what transactions will trigger the
application of Rule 14d-10. 48 It should be noted, however, that the
functional method is followed only in some jurisdictions, whereas the
others apply the formal approach. 49
The formal method, itself
consisting of a rigid definition of Rule 14d-10, is much easier to define
and bypass. 5 The formal method dictates that as long as the agreement
in question was not made "during or pursuant" to a tender offer, the
agreement does not become a part of the tender offer and does not alert
application of Rule 14d-10. 5'
Contrary to the formal approach, the implication of the functional
analysis is very difficult to bypass or satisfy." 2 When contemplating an
outside transaction in connection with a tender offer in the functional
method jurisdiction, acquirers are advised to follow these guidelines:
* When making an employment agreement with the target's
director, executive or employee, the acquirer should offer
intangible incentives; spread payments over time instead of
giving one lump sum; structure incentives to induce the recipient
to stay with the company and not cash out and leave."'

145. Id. at 801.
146. See Field v. Trump, 850 F.2d 938, 943-47 (2d Cir. 1998); Epstein, 50 F.3d at
654.
147. See Epstein, 50 F.3d at 649-58.
148. See id. at 654; Field, 850 F.2d at 943-47.
149. See Walther, supra note 3, at 801.
150. See Lerro v. Quaker Oats Co., 84 F.3d 239, 240-42 (7th Cir. 1996).
151. See id. at 244 (finding distribution agreement, signed prior to tender offer, not
in violation of Rule 14d-10); Walker v. Shield Acquisition Corp., 145 F. Supp. 2d 1360,
1371-72 (N.D. Ga. 2001) (holding that consideration agreements, signed before the
offer began, did not occur during the tender offer and was not subject to Rule 14d-10).
152. See Walther, supra note 3, at 778.
153. See Shearman & Sterling, supra note 73, at 2.

524

FORDHAM JOURNAL OF CORPORATE &
FINANCIAL LAW

[Vol. IX

* Employment agreement should be offered by the target instead
154
of the acquirer.
* Employment agreement should not be conditioned on success of
155
the tender offer.
* Employment agreement should not be related to
the price of the
15 6
recipient.
the
by
held
shares
the
or
offer
tender
* Employment agreement should be consistent with the fair
57
market value for such services.
should be properly disclosed in
* Employment agreement
8
disclosures.1
pertinent
* Employment agreement should explicitly disclaim any effort to
induce tender of shares.
* Structure a long-form merger transaction instead of a tender
offer, since mergers are not regulated by Rule 14d- 10.' 9
* Non-competition agreements should have detailed calculations
based on market value and expert opinions.
* Business-continuation agreements, licenses and patent rights
should be consistent with fair market value.
* A proper paper trail of every discussion that led to a decision
must be kept to show genuine intent.' 60
These are the minimal guidelines that acquirers should follow to
61
avoid liability under Rule 14d-10 in functional method jurisdictions.'
It should be noted that the above guidelines only have the potential of
154. See id. (indicating that the target and its executives should make employment
agreements, not the acquirer).
Id.; see also Jacobs, supra note 73, at 3; Stacey A. Terral, Securities: Incentives
155.
Agreements at Time of Acquisition Held in Violation of the 1934 Act, 3 TRANSACTIONS

40 (2001) (summarizing the Katt decision and suggesting methods to bypass the
application of Rule 14d- 10).
156. See Jacobs, supra note 73, at 3; see also Ebert, supra note 2, at 705.
157. See Shearman & Sterling, supra note 73, at 2 (proposing that employment
arrangement be made on customary market terms).
158.
159.

See id.
See id. at 3.

160. Because courts may use a test of "intent and circumstances," keeping a paper
trail is important for a showing of legitimate intent. See Walther, supra note 3, at 785,
for a discussion of the test in Field v. Trump, 850 F.2d 938 (2d Cir. 1988).
161. See Shearman & Sterling, supra note 73, at 3 ("[U]ntil the case law develops
further, acquirers should consider carefully any employment arrangements proposed in
connection with a tender offer.").
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shielding the acquirer and should not be applied literally. The integral
part of the functional method is that the courts examine each transaction
on case-by-case basis, and therefore, the guidelines above should merely
62
provide an initial framework for crafting a side transaction.
CONCLUSION

Congress and the SEC promulgated laws and regulations governing
63
tender offers and treatment of a target company's security holders.
The All Holders/Best Price Rule was crafted to ensure that an acquiring
company cannot selectively favor some security holders in connection
with a tender offer.' 64 Applied broadly, the rule invalidated legitimate
transactions between the acquirer and target security holders, in which
the acquirer tried to encourage continued employment, renew a business
contract or secure a non-competition promise.
Faced with this dilemma, Circuits split and crafted functional and
formal methods of reviewing such transactions. The former examines
each transaction on a case-by-case basis and determines whether the
outside agreement played an integral part in the tender offer. 65 The
latter applies a bright-line test to separate all transactions made during or
166
pursuant to tender offers.
Absent formal guidance from Congress, the SEC or the courts and
fearing enormous liability of Rule 14d- 10, companies begin to abandon
tender offer plans, frustrating the purposes of free-market economy.
Some guidelines can be derived from the functionalist courts, thereby
providing some basic framework for structuring transactions in
connection with tender offers. 167 However, the SEC indicated that the
dilemma is being reviewed and probably will provide more certain
guidelines shortly.
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See Walther, supranote 3, at 785.
See Ebert, supranote 2, at 680-85.
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